Abstract Abstract [Excerpt] REITs are attractive to investors, particularly institutional investors, due to their high dividend payouts and ability to provide more liquidity to the underlying market for direct real estate investment. This chapter analyzes the performance of real estate investment trusts (REITs). It compares the returns on REITs with those on more traditional asset classes, specifically bonds and mid-cap equities, and surveys the academic literature dealing with the diverse issues related to valuation. The chapter also examines the linkages between REIT performance and the behavior of the underlying real estate market. Because the chapter takes the perspective of a U.S.-based investor, it does not directly address the broader issues of global REITs.
Introduction
REITs are attractive to investors, particularly institutional investors, due to their high dividend payouts and ability to provide more liquidity to the underlying market for direct real estate investment. This chapter analyzes the performance of real estate investment trusts (REITs). It compares the returns on REITs with those on more traditional asset classes, specifically bonds and mid-cap equities, and surveys the academic literature dealing with the diverse issues related to valuation. The chapter also examines the linkages between REIT performance and the behavior of the underlying real estate market. Because the chapter takes the perspective of a U.S.-based investor, it does not directly address the broader issues of global REITs.
REIT Performance
The original design of REITs was to provide individual investors with more liquid access to commercial real estate markets. Their structure as an essentially tax-free conduit with severe restrictions on possible investments and dividend payout made REITs a very transparent and liquid asset class that has undergone many structural changes. This section documents the explosive growth and inconsistent performance of REITs. .1 data (taken from http://www.REIT.com) include equity REITs (those that own property), mortgage REITs (those that make loans or own MBS), and hybrid REITs (those that do both). In the earlier periods, mortgage REITs were the majority of the total REIT population, but by 1976 equity REITs eclipsed mortgage REITs as measured by market cap. The hybrid REIT market was comparable in size to the mortgage REIT sector until 2001 when the latter market enjoyed substantial growth. Mortgage REITs from a 2000 level of $1.6 billion have become a $59 billion market (almost 10 percent of the total REIT capitalization) while the hybrid REIT has essentially disappeared. This chapter focuses only on equity REITs.
REAL ESTATE RETURNS
Endowment funds, pension funds, mutual funds, and other types of institutional investors view real estate as an important investment category. This investment is done through securitized or direct form. Securitized real estate is through holding REITs or real estate mutual funds.
Direct investment is via ownership of real estate assets. Thus, a subject of considerable importance is the different performance of direct as opposed to securitized real estate investment.
A great advantage of publicly traded REITs is their transparency. By trading on major exchanges, like any public equity, determining historical return characteristics is straightforward and offers comparability. The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) maintains an extensive website at http://www.reit.com. NAREIT offers detailed information on REIT performance by type and geographic region. The NAREIT index, which is used in this chapter, provides an accurate benchmark for the performance of U.S. commercial real estate.
For direct investment in real estate, performance measurement is more complex, largely due to the infrequency of trades. This lack of transaction prices requires inferring market values through appraisals. For many years the most important index was the NCREIF Property Index, which is an appraisal-based measure of the unlevered return on investment grade properties.
Appraisal-based measures have several flaws, notably their tendency to smooth returns, which understates the true volatility. Chinloy, Cho, and Megbolugbe (1997) discuss this and other possible appraisal biases. The research surrounding this topic is extensive, as in Gatzlaff and Geltner (1998) and Geltner and Goetzmann (2000) . Fisher, Geltner, and Pollakowski (2007) develop a quarterly transaction-based index (TBI) of property-level investment performance for major property types included in NCREIF. Their methodology extends earlier work by Geltner (1991) on commercial real estate indexes. The following empirical work primarily focuses on the TBI index.
COMPARATIVE RETURNS
To help frame the remainder of the analysis, presenting an overview of the returns on REITs and other major investment classes is instructive. Figure 11 .2 shows the growth of $1 invested in five broad asset classes: (l) 10-year government bonds, (2) 90-day Treasury bills, (3) REITs as measured by the FTSE NAREIT index, available from http://www.reit.com, (4) capital appreciation on direct real estate investment as measured by the MIT TBI transaction-based index, available from http://web.mit.edu/ere/research/credl/tbi.html, and (5) returns on mid-cap stocks. The last is a value-weighted index constructed from U.S. equities in the third to seventh deciles of market cap, based on data from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The data begin in the first quarter of 1984 to coincide with the initiation of the TBI index and end in the last quarter of 2012.
Over this 29-year period, a dollar invested in government bonds grew to 10.6 (a geometric annual return of 8.48 percent); a dollar invested in Treasury bills grew to 3.24 (a geometric return of 4.14 percent); and a dollar invested in mid-cap equities returned 18.26 (a geometric return of 10.54 percent). The REIT index geometric return was 9.11 percent. This The lack of correlation of REIT returns with appreciation of the underlying properties is an important characteristic of REITs and will be explored further. These results are generally consistent with those obtained in Feldman (2003) during the 1987-2001 period. Similarly, using a vector autoregression approach, Glascock, Lu, and So (2000) show that REITs are more correlated with small stocks and less correlated with bonds after 1992.
Insert Figure 11 .3 Here Table 11 .1 summarizes the key statistics for the return series studied in this chapter.
Again the table shows that REIT returns more closely resemble the returns from mid-cap equities than the returns on the underlying real estate or bonds. REIT total returns lie between the returns on riskless bonds and the returns on mid-cap equities. These results are typical of those obtained in much earlier studies such as Goetzmann and Siegel (1984) . With the exception of the REIT income returns, the series show moderate skewness, with the typical slightly negative skewness for the REIT and equity returns. Each series shows excess kurtosis or peakedness.
SHARPE RATIOS
An important way to measure the efficiency of investment in REITs versus more traditional instruments is via the Sharpe ratio, which is a standard measure of the (retrospective) risk-return trade-off as the excess return over the riskless rate divided by the returns standard deviation. However, the data from Table 11 .1 show significant departures from the assumption of normally distributed returns, suggesting some caution in interpreting the Sharpe ratio in this context (Leland 1999) . Figure 11 .3 graphs the rolling six-year Sharpe ratio for the four return series. Specifically, the average realized quarterly returns net of the 90-day Treasury bill rate is computed for that quarter. This average excess return is divided by the standard deviation over the corresponding rolling six-year period. This estimation is rolled forward by one quarter until the data end.
Insert Table 11 .1 Here Over the entire sample bonds have the highest ratio (0.537), followed by mid-cap equities (0.456) and REITs (0.354). The TBI has a negative ratio (-0.080). The Sharpe ratio for REITs is negative for the first few years of the 1990s but then remains positive for the remainder of the sample period. The REIT index has a lower standard deviation than the mid-cap equity series.
Nevertheless, its average Sharpe ratio is still lower than that for mid-cap. These series show considerable nonstationarity, notably in the two real estate ones for REITs and TBI. Recent evidence suggests that REIT returns exhibit very significant and abrupt regime shifts (Peng and Schulz 2012; Bianchi and Guidolin 2013) .
FACTOR MODELS
The final analysis of REIT returns is through estimation of a simple return-generating model. These models establish a linkage between the REIT index returns and return indexes of related investments. Such models usually relate REIT returns to a bond index since their high dividend payout makes REITs a reasonable substitute for bonds. The models also include an equity index because REITs are a type of mid-cap equity. The third factor relates to the returns on the underlying real estate market. The estimated model is the following:
where is the REIT index return in quarter ; α is a constant; is the 10-year government bond return in quarter ; is the return on the mid-cap index in quarter ; is the appreciation in the TBI index in quarter ; and is the return on the NCREIF index in quarter . Using both real estate return indexes can hopefully capture the income and the capital appreciation components of the returns on direct investment in real estate.
Insert Table 11 .2 Here Table 11 .2 for the most recent decade make this explanation less plausible. This factor model estimation has some noteworthy implications: (l) it is highly nonstationary (i.e., the weights on the factors and the overall fit are quite different in the three estimation periods); (2) the bond factor is much less important than the mid-cap equity factor; and (3) the two return series for the underlying real estate returns are insignificant.
A subsequent section discusses further some reasons for and implications of the apparent lack of a linkage between the returns on direct and securitized real estate. Some of the main hypotheses for why securitized returns in the form of REITs may differ from returns on the underlying real estate as measured by the TBI are the following. First, REITs are a levered investment, while the TBI is unlevered. Because the market value of REIT debt or the REIT s cost of debt is not observed, accurately de-levering the REIT returns or levering the TBI returns to make them perfectly comparable to the REIT index is difficult.
Second, because REITs are traded equity, their value should impound expectations of future economic conditions in an efficient market. The TBI may embed future economic conditions through the most recent transactions underlying the index. However, it is unlikely to be as forward looking as the publicly traded equity markets. Several studies analyzing the leadlag relationship between real and securitized real estate markets generally find that the securitized market leads the underlying market. Yavas and Yildirim (2011) provide recent example using a dynamic conditional correlation GARCH model. Fourth, REIT returns can be distorted due to noise trading (Black 1986) . A noise trader makes investment decisions based on perceived market movements rather than a security s fundamentals. Thus, a noise trader buys when others are buying and sells when others are selling.
Because REITs are traded equities, noise traders in the public equities markets potentially drive prices away from fundamental values. In such a situation, the correlation between REITs and the underlying real estate could be quite low, especially when the costs to exploit such mispricing are high. The references cited in the following section dealing with momentum in the return generating process develop these ideas further.
RELATED LITERATURE ON REIT RETURN PROCESSES
Although the previously discussed REIT return-generating results are similar to those presented in Clayton and MacKinnon (2003) , they are not strictly comparable. The authors study
REITs over a much earlier sample period: 1979 to 1998. Their return-generating process includes a large-cap and small-cap equity index, bond returns, and the NCREIF returns. Furthermore, they orthogonalize their factors and use a variance decomposition approach.
This subject remains an active area of research interest. Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003) and Derwall, Huij, Brounen, and Marquering (2009) provide considerable support for the presence of a momentum factor in REIT pricing. More recently, Goebel, Harrison, Mercer, and Whitby (2013) study momentum together with a "characteristic-based" approach in the spirit of Daniel and Titman (1998) . This technique uses the underlying characteristics of a security such as the book-to-market ratio to explain differences in returns. Goebel et al. find that larger returns are associated with higher book-to-market ratios, less liquidity, and lower levels of institutional ownership. They further find that the premium associated with high book-to-market ratios is present only during periods of monetary expansion.
REITS AS PART OF AN INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO
Given the above discussion, one issue is how REITs fit within a typical pension or endowment fund portfolio. The early literature suggests that a 10 to 20 percent allocation to real estate is plausible (Fogler 1984; Firstenberg, Ross, and Zisler 1988) . Kallberg, Liu, and Grieg (1996) use actual cash flow data from a portfolio of direct investment in real estate to re-examine this issue. Using integer programming to capture inherent "lumpiness" of real estate investment, they show that an allocation of about 9 percent is optimal. This latter figure seems to match the figures quoted by practitioners. For example, in a survey of more than 700 U.S. pension and endowment funds, Clayton (2007) finds that equity real estate represented 6.1 percent of total assets in 2006. Fugazza, Guidolin, and Nicodano (2009) show that adding REITs to the investment opportunity set can (out-of-sample) improve the investor s Sharpe ratio.
Factors Driving REIT Performance
The remainder of this chapter addresses the determinants of differences in REIT performance.
Although the following analysis is not exhaustive, it examines several possible factors. governance characteristics usually coded in binary form and then added to measure the strength of shareholder rights. They conclude that the impact of governance and valuation is unresolved.
This result maybe partially due to the relative scarcity of hostile takeovers.
Using Tobins Qj Hartzell, Kallberg, and Liu (2008) show that corporate governance plays an important role in the IPO valuation of a REIT. Qis defined as the (offer price x shares outstanding + total assets -book equity) divided by total assets. It is measured at the IPO stage to mitigate possible endogeneity problems. After including various control variables to explain the IPO Q, the authors find that higher valuations are associated with lower management fees or REIT structure and performance 14 compensation, more variable or incentive-based compensation, and greater insider ownership.
More than half of publicly traded REITs are incorporated in Maryland, usually as trusts.
Maryland offers greater liability protection, easier bylaw amendments and protection against hostile takeovers. A strong negative valuation effect also occurs for incorporation in Maryland, which is a state known to be management friendly. They find similar results regarding post-IPO performance and governance.
More recently, Bauer, Eichholtz, and Kok (2010) use the Corporate Governance Quotient index of Institutional Shareholder Services to examine the linkage between the level of corporate governance and REIT performance. They find that governance is significantly related to firm value only for REITs with low payout ratios. These low payout ratios can result from multiple sources, including managerial compensation, non-property expenses or high levels of capital expenditures.
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
In many ways REITs act like regular corporations and in other ways they do not.
Institutional ownership is one place where REITs as an industry are likely to behave differently from non-REITs. The reason for this is that ownership tests form part of the requirements to maintain REIT status. So unlike regular firms that do not face these restrictions, regulation imposes a friction on the ownership structure of REITs.
REIT OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENTS
Internal Revenue Code section 856 provides the ownership requirements that REITs face in order to maintain REIT status. REIT ownership essentially has two requirements. First, as stated in section 856(a)(5), the firm must have at least 100 beneficial owners. For most publicly traded companies, this is unlikely to be a major restriction. However, it is potentially an issue for private investors wanting to use the REIT structure. Second, the firm cannot be closely held, which is covered in section 856(h). This second restriction is what is commonly referred to as the "five or fewer" rule, and essentially states that no five or fewer persons can own 50 percent or more of the REIT. Although the rule itself is somewhat more complicated than it is commonly phrased, the end result is that serious limits exist on concentrated ownership.
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 included a look-through provision related to pension fund ownership in REITs. This provision allowed a fund to be considered as the set of its beneficiaries, rather than as a single entity. The impact of this provision was to make all the beneficiaries of the pension fund individual owners from the perspective of the five or fewer rule.
As Downs (1998) (2010) shows that higher levels of institutional ownership are related to higher levels of synchronicity with REITs of the same asset type.
Finally, the impact of the global financial crisis can be seen on the level of REIT institutional ownership in the latter part of the sample. Although ownership levels remained fairly stable for non-REITs, REIT institutional ownership fell dramatically at the start of the financial crisis but has since rebounded to near pre-crisis levels. Devos, Ong, Spieler, and Tsang (2013) show that during this period, institutional investors displayed a flight to quality by investing in REITs that were larger and had lower betas.
Insert Figure Inside ownership tends to decline as firms become larger, while institutional ownership increases.
THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP ON PRICING
The prevailing assumption in corporate finance is that higher levels of institutional ownership have a positive influence on equity returns (McConnell and Servaes 1990).
Institutional ownership could affect firm performance through several potential mechanisms.
Gompers and Metrick (2001) describe one channel where institutional ownership is associated with higher returns. They contend that if the demand and supply curves for stocks are not perfectly elastic; then demand shocks could cause changes in stock prices and thus returns. This is often called the price pressure effect. In this sense; institutional ownership may predict stock returns. Furthermore, if institutional investors have preferences for certain firm characteristics, then a shock to institutional ownership will have a disproportionately large effect on firms with those characteristics. Gompers and Metrick show that this appears to be the case for a large sample of firms. Institutions tend to favor larger, more liquid stocks that generally have low past returns. Higher levels of institutional investment predict higher future returns.
Insert According to Ling and Ryngaert (1997) , institutional ownership may lead to a change in price dynamics around REIT IPOs. They find that in the 1970s and 1980s, REIT IPOs tend to be overpriced and subsequently exhibit underperformance compared to other REITs during the 100 days after an IPO. This relationship reverses itself in the IPOs of the early 1990s. In this market, characterized by higher institutional ownership, IPOs tend to be underpriced by 3.6 percent on average. They modestly outperform other REITs during the 100 days after an IPO.
Rather than being due to demand shocks, Yan and Zhang (2009) Institutional owners can also affect firm performance through a corporate governance mechanism. If one believes that institutional investors are better monitors than retail investors, then ownership may affect performance through better oversight of management. Chung, Fung, and Hung (2012) show institutional ownership has a positive effect on REIT efficiency.
REIT VALUATION AND DIVIDENDS
Because the majority of REIT returns come from the dividend cash flow, various studies investigate how REIT dividend policy influences REIT valuation. Kallberg, Liu, and Srinivasan (2003) show a tie between REIT values and their dividend payout. They find that, unlike for equity indexes, present value and dividend pricing models cannot be rejected for REITs, reinforcing the link between REIT values and dividend payouts. This result is in contrast to the rejection of these models for equity indexes (Campbell and Shiller 1988) .
The market reaction to dividend cuts by REITs is similar to the results obtained for regular corporations: dividend cuts (increases) receive a negative (positive) announcement effect (Wang, Erickson, and Gau 1993) . Although this finding suggests that REIT managers have some discretion of dividend payouts, the issue of REIT dividends and performance remains an open question. As Boudry (2011) discusses, REIT dividends can be decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary components. Because of the dividend distribution requirements imposed on REITs in order to maintain status, REITs in practice typically distribute at least 100 percent of their taxable income and capital gains in dividends each year. REITs are required to distribute 90 percent of funds from operations after reserves.
REITs apparently use discretionary dividends that do not have an obvious tax motivation to smooth the overall level of dividends. So the meaning of a high dividend payout for a REIT is unclear. The firm could have high taxable income or could be paying large discretionary dividends. Because the discretionary and non-discretionary make up of dividends is only known during the subsequent period, examining the markets reactions to discretionary and nondiscretionary dividends is difficult. 
REITS AND THE UNDERLYING REAL ESTATE MARKET

Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has analyzed the historical performance of U.S. equity REITs and some factors underlying the differences in this performance. Measured in diverse ways including means and standard deviations of quarterly returns, Sharpe ratios, and factor models contemporaneously, the data show that REIT returns are more similar to mid-cap equities than to bonds or to the returns on the underlying real estate. These data also show how dynamic these relationships are. The Sharpe ratios vary widely over the sample timeframe. The R2s and the factor loadings in the return-generating model are very different in the three sample periods studied.
The second part of this chapter studied the possible factors that influence the risk and return of REITs. In general, strong corporate governance and higher levels of institutional ownership positively influence REIT returns. REITs are an important class of investments for institutional investors. The data show that in the largest size decile, institutional ownership is 93.1 percent of the total.
A REIT is often considered an equity that is relatively easy to value because of the constraints on its investment activities and its transparency. Yet, the literature surveyed in this chapter suggests a complex relationship between REIT returns and their possible determinants.
In particular, the link between REIT returns and dividend policy is hard to characterize. Despite the recent refinements in measures of the returns on direct real estate investment, many issues remain unresolved concerning the linkages between the real and securitized real estate markets. Note: This table presents the basic statistics for the return sample. The basic data are quarterly returns annualized beginning in the first quarter of 1978 and ending in the last quarter of 2012, except the TBI index, which begins in the first quarter of 1984. The data sources are NCREIF (http:// web.mit.edu/cre/research/credl/) and WRDS. The means, medians, and standard deviations are in percentages. where is the REIT index return in quarter ; α is a constant; is the 10-year government bond return in quarter ; is the return on the mid-cap index in quarter ; is the appreciation in the TBI index in quarter ; and is the return on the NCREIF index in quarter . The estimation is done separately over the periods 1984 to 1993, 1994 to 2003, and 2004 to 2012 . The -values are given in parentheses. Note: This table reports ownership data by market cap decile for 138 equity REITs in the FTSE/ NAREIT equity REIT index in the first quarter of 2013. Average institutional ownership is the average level of institutional ownership for firms in a given decile. Firms with ownership greater than 100 percent were winsorized to 100 percent. Average inside ownership is the average level of ownership of firm insiders for a given decile. Average market cap is the average market cap of firms in a given decile. The FTSE/NAREIT index constituent list is from NAREIT s web page (http://www.reit.com). SNL is the source for all other data.
